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CURBING "PEACE-IMPERILING" PROPAGANDA*
WADE J. NEWHOUSE, JR.t
I have been asked to address my remarks to the question of constitutional limita-
tions applicable to international agreements concerning propaganda. Undoubtedly
we are all "for peace" and presumably sympathetic to attempts to curb those factors
which contribute to war. Therefore, one might properly ask, is propaganda a factor
so contributory to war that it ought to be restrained? On the nature and effect of
propaganda we have the testimony of two participants in this conference. Professors
Whitton and Larson, in their book on propaganda1 take as their subject "not what
to do about propaganda in general, but what can be done with the kinds of propa-
ganda-war-mongering, subversive, and defamatory-that imperil the peace."' Pre-
sumably that is the focus of this conference, and I take their definitions, in the
absence of official governmental proposals, as a starting point for discussion. Dis-
tinguishing between "good" and "bad" propaganda, they concern themselves with
that type of propaganda which "tends to produce a breach of peace."'3 This category
is further refined in the following terms. They state that "war-mongering propa-
ganda directly undermines peace by actually fomenting war, preparing people for
war, and building up incidents or ideas that will bring on war."4 With respect to
subversive propaganda, they assert:
[A]Ithough it may not be as blatant and obvious in its menace to peace, [it] has
perhaps done more to disrupt peace than any other form of propaganda. The ob-
jective of such propaganda is ordinarily to produce violence within a country-the
violence necessary to overthrow the existing political order, to stir up domestic strife,
to set class against class, and to turn people against their government.a
Their third category, defamatory propaganda,
also imperils peace, although perhaps not as directly or immediately as the other
two kinds. Nevertheless, when defamation and false news are sufficiently extreme
* This article is based largely on an address made at the Conference on the International Law of
Propaganda, held at Duke University on February 18-i9, 1966. Documentation and footnotes have been
added.
t A.B. 1948, Southwestern College at Memphis; LL.B. '95i, University of Michigan. Professor of
Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
' JOHN B. WITroN & ARTHUR LARSON, PROPAGANDA: TowARDs DISARMAMENT IN THE WAR OF W ODS
(1964) [hereinafter cited as WHrIroN & IARSON]. Their book is heavily documented and carries an ex-
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and persistent, they tend to create hatreds, fears and passions whose predictable
outlet is violence. 6
The question is, under what circumstances might restrictions by the United States
upon such propaganda raise constitutional issues? In this respect, it is necessary to
note that Professors Whitton and Larson suggest the primary problem with respect
to propaganda is propaganda by governments.7 And an international agreement
proposing to restrict propaganda by governments would seem to raise no substantial
questions of United States constitutional law.8 But as a corollary they also suggest,
and rightly I believe, that restraints on propaganda by private persons is of relatively
little real consequence. If this is so, then perhaps the subject of my remarks is
entirely fanciful, and, as one of the commentators has suggested in a comparable
situation,9 one does not care to be entirely fanciful in considering constitutional
problems. Fortunately, the situation is saved by Professors Whitton and Larson who
suggest that efforts to control propaganda by private persons, although of relatively
minor consequence, do have a raison detre because of-pardon the expression-their
"propaganda" value.'0 Perhaps that should be "evidence of good intention." In any
case, with that reassurance, perhaps we may proceed without being engaged entirely
in an academic exercise.
But it will be helpful to broaden the topic to include unilateral efforts by the
United States, as well as the making of international agreements. In addition, for
meaningful discussion, some assumptions will provide concreteness. Thus the basic
issues can be posed by assuming the following alternatives:
I. Either a statute passed by Congress, or a treaty entered into by the United
States which
a. provides punishment for warmongering, subversive, and defamatory propa-




8 But if the concern is with the Government restricting itself, suppose we have an agreement not to
publish certain information which, by hypothesis, is "necessary" for an "informed" citizenry on matters of
public policy. If this is seen as a clash between "the right to hear" and "government secrecy for
security" then one might catch strains of a first amendment problem as suggested by the discussion of
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), in the text accompanying notes 56-64 inIra.
Compare the analogous clash between congressional interest in information and the executive demands for
secrecy set forth in Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 1044 (1965).
' Nathanson, Constitutional Problems Involved in Adherence by the United States to a Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 50 CORNuLL L.Q. 235 (1965), based on a
paper prepared for the Cornell Fifth Summer Conference on International Law, May 1964.
0 WmrroN & LAsoN 240: "Why, in the view of the probable rarity of such offenses, would it be
worth the trouble to pass such a statute [punishing warmongering propaganda by individuals] ? . . .
[One] useful result would be to show that the democracies are willing within the framework of their
own constitutional traditions to do everything they can with their domestic law to help solve the propa-
ganda problem. This would help clear the way to get on with more essential moves, such as the adoption
of genuine remedies through the United Nations and through treaties."
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b. possibly restricts the entry of such expressions from without the borders of
the United States, regardless of whether the utterances are by individuals or
foreign governments.
2. Some kind of presidential action regulating such propaganda; either
a. an executive agreement entered into without participation by Congress, or
b. unilateral presidential action of some form described more specifically later.
Moreover, as with all discussions of constitutional law involving action of the
federal government, one must consider the question of power, as well as limitations.
There would seem to be no serious question of power. From the wide range of
powers available-the power of Congress to regulate foreign affairs," the power of
self-preservation invoked by Chief Justice Vinson in Dennis v. United States,12 the
treaty power,'1 the war powers,14 perhaps even the grab-bag commerce clause,' " and
the power of the President to conduct foreign relations'--certainly the federal gov-
ernment would find power to regulate, to a degree, the type of expression in ques-
tionl "To a degree"'s--the serious question concerns the extent to which the
Constitution, more specifically the first amendment, restricts the United States Govern-
ment if it should attempt to regulate warmongering, subversive, and defamatory
propaganda.
The first amendment questions may best be taken in two steps. First, the
"ordinary" first amendment situation: What doctrine, or doctrines, has the Supreme
Court developed with respect to facts not seen as involving the conduct of foreign
relations? Second, will it make a difference which source of federal power is relied
on? That is, will the involvement of the conduct of foreign relations make a sig-
nificant difference? Are there certain powers either not limited by the Bill of
Rights or, at least, less rigorously limited than others? What role will the concept
"The scope and source of the power are analyzed in the seminal article by Henkin, The Treaty
Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 903 (95).
15341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951).
1 8 The standard reference materials are gathered in WILLIAM W. BISHOP, JR., CA sES ON INTERNATIONAL
L.Aw 87-94 (2d ed. 1962). However, with respect to uncertainties concerning the scope of this power,
see Lissitzyn, The Law of International Agreements in the Restatement, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 96, 113-17
(1966), a critical review of the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OsF THE UNIrED STATES
(1965).
1
,On the subject generally, See EDWARD S. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION (1947).
1' Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
On the subject generally, see EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND PowEns ch. 5 (4 th
rev. ed. 1957).
", Compare the statement by Henkin, supra note 1i, at 933: "The complicated facts of national and
international life have also complicated the powers of Congress themselves. Few situations requiring
regulation fall within one area only of congressional interest and authority. Analysis of congressional
power may, then, tend to deal in sums of congressional powers."
SS This phrase assumes a position at odds with the "absolutists" in the controversy usually described as
"absolutists" versus the "balancers" in constitutional litigation. For a summary of the sounder points
against the "absolutists" see Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 196o Sup. CT. REv. 75,
78-81. Of course, the complexities of giving meaning to broad constitutional norms belie the apparent
simplicities suggested by terms such as "absolutists" and "balancing." Compare Reich, Mr. Justice Black
and the Living Constitution, 76 H v. L. Rzv. 673, 736-44 (1963).
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of "embarrassment of the executive" play? Is the problem ultimately to be resolved
by making the question one of "survival"?
I
"ORDINARY" Fnsr AMENDMENT SITUATIONS
The more things change, the more they seem to remain the same. In 1964, in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,19 the United States Supreme Court invalidated a
libel judgment on first amendment grounds. The significance of that decision for my
topic is suggested by the following provocative comment on the case.
It is strange how rapidly things change. Just a little more than a decade ago we
were all concerned with devising legal controls for the libeling of groups. The war
and the rise of fascism had made us suddenly sensitive to the evils of systematic
defamation of minority groups, sensitive to the new and unexpected power of
malevolent propaganda. Existing doctrines of free speech appeared to cast long
shadows over the validity of any legal efforts at control. Then, in 1952, the Su-
preme Court got its chance at the problem and in Beauharnais v. Illinois held that
group-libel laws could be constitutional. 20
In the New York Times case, the Court retreated significantly from Beauharnais,2'
to the almost unanimous applause of legal commentators, 22 and brought libel clearly
within the ambit of the first amendment. Yet, here we are again concerned with
restraints upon "malevolent propaganda," and asking are there any serious constitu-
tional impediments to curbing such utterances.
Those familiar with Supreme Court precedent in the area of freedom of expression
are aware of the folly of predicting the course of constitutional law without recourse
to the matured facts of concrete controversies 3 Nevertheless, given definitions of
warmongering propaganda, subversive propaganda, and defamatory propaganda
comparable to those of Professors Whitton and Larson,2 4 one finds that comparable
terms have been dealt with by the Supreme Court in past evaluations of legislative
collisions with first amendment principles. The similarity of statutory language and
factual situation is found principally in those cases concerned with governmental
restraint on political speech and association legislatively characterized as "subversive."
But before proceeding to a discussion of these decisions, it is wise to recall that
one man's warmongering may well be another's criticism of government. This
10 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
"oHARRY KALvEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRsT AmENDMENT 7 (1965).
21343 U.S. 250 (1952), reh. denied, 343 U.S. 988 (1952).
"' Except that the language of the opinion was directed to criticism of the official conduct of "public
officials" and questions have been raised whether the proper first amendment focus should have been
simply on discussion of "public issues." See Note, The Scope of First Amendment Protection for Good-
Faith Defamatory Error, 75 YALE L.J. 642 (1966).
"8 Compare Brandeis, J., concurring in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (936). And see
the incisive analysis by Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 CoLum. L. Rav. i (1964).
24 See text accompanying notes 4-6 supra.
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proposition makes it appealing to look for guidelines in Professor Kalven's thesis
2
'
that the opinion in the New York Times case offers a guideline to the core meaning
of the first amendment in terms of seditious libel, described by him briefly as "the doc-
trine that criticism of government officials and policy may be viewed as defamation of
government and may be punished as a serious crime."26 He concludes that "the
touchstone of the First Amendment has become the abolition of seditious libel and
what that implies about the function of free speech on public issues in American
democracy."'  Recall that the New York Times case arose out of the protest move-
ment concerning racial equality in the United States-a movement vitally concerned
with governmental policy. The controversial publication in question was a news-
paper advertisement, critical of governmental treatment of Negroes active in the civil
rights movement 8 Given Kalven's thesis, we may speculate that insofar as attempts
to suppress warmongering, subversive, and defamatory propaganda are, in specific
instances, directed at criticisms of governmental officials and governmental policy,
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan may be taken as affording substantial protection
for such utterances. How substantial? The language of New York Times is
not that of a balancing formula concerned with degree but is more in the spirit
of the "absolute" theory of the first amendment. However, before exploring the
question of how substantial, consider a possible analytical distinction when criticism
involves foreign relations.
By definition, does not warmongering propaganda involve some likelihood of
criticism being directed at the policy of a foreign government? If so, remember
that Professor Kalven's version of New York Times focuses upon the essential role
of free speech in a democratic society and the consequent prohibition against the
government of that society applying sanctions to criticisms of itself. Nevertheless,
the expression of ideas with respect to matters of government relates to the formula-
tion of a foreign policy as much as it does to policies of a domestic nature, at least
in this rapidly shrinking world of ours. And criticism of foreign governmental
officials and foreign governmental policy is intimately intertwined with the formula-
"' Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,"
1964 Sup. Cr. REV. 191.
"' HARRY KALwvEr, JR., Tim NEGRO AND Tim FIRsr AmENDAMENT 15 (1965).
Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment ,
1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 209. On the question whether the intent of the framers of the first amendment
was to eliminate seditious libel, Kalven is opposed by LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION
(ig6o). See also Brant, Seditious Libel: Myth and Reality, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1 (1964); Franklin, The
Origins and Constitutionality of Limitations on Truth as a Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REv. 789
(x964). For provocative suggestions concerning a libertarian position for freedom of expression, see the
book review by Professor Willmoore Kendall, x6 STAN. L. REV. 755 (1964), reviewing LEONARD W. LEVY,
JEFFERSON AND CivrL LIBERTIEs: TnE DARKER SIDE (1963).
1 8 The paid political advertisement solicited funds for the defense of Martin Luther King, Jr., and
described alleged deprivations of Negroes' rights in the South, especially with respect to Negro demon-
strators. The advertisement was signed by several members of the "Committee to Defend Martin Luther
King . . ." including nationally well-known individuals such as Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt. Plaintiff, Sulli-
van, was the elected city commissioner responsible for supervision of the Montgomery police. There were
some factual inaccuracies in the advertisement.
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tion of a foreign policy. Therefore, no reason is apparent for distinguishing attempts
by the United States to punish propaganda because the particular utterance might
be directed at a government other than that of the United States.
But even though the New York Times case may be read by some as barring
the punishment of criticism of governments and governmental policy on the grounds
that such criticism is seditious libel, unanswered constitutional questions concerning
how much protection remain. On the heels of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, in
the fall of 1964, the Supreme Court reviewed a criminal libel conviction of a local
district attorney who had published defamatory statements about the judges of the
local criminal court and held the conviction unconstitutional. The opinion in that
case, Garrison v. Louisiana,29 leads one to believe that the Court will not adhere
strictly to Professor Kalven's thesis and that we must ultimately turn to some version
of the clear-and-present-danger formula when criticism of government and govern-
mental policy is cast in the form of words which may also be characterized as triggers
to action a° And it is such trigger-words that are our concern. The arguments in
favor of restricting warmongering, subversive, and defamatory propaganda seem to
have as their principal thrust the notion that the supposed danger from the utter-
ances is the danger of illegal warfare-the "big brother," I suppose, of breach of
peace on the domestic scene. Therefore, as helpful as New York Times may he,
the most relevant line of precedent must be those cases concerning legislative
proscription of allegedly subversive speech or association culminating doctrinally in
the Dennis-Yates-Scales1 trilogy concerning prosecutions under the Smith Act.
If Gitlow v. New York,3 2 quoted approvingly by Professors Whitton and Larson,"3
were still the law then we could stop right here. For in Gitlow, which upheld the
New York criminal anarchy statute, the majority gave great weight to the legislative
determination that "utterances advocating the overthrow of organized government
by force, violence and unlawful means, are so inimical to the general welfare and
involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be penalized."'3 4 It further
stated that the test for measuring the application of such legislative proscriptions to
specific utterances would be met if the utterances' "natural tendency and probable
effect was to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body might
prevent." 5 That interpretation of the meaning of the first amendment would raise
29379 U.s. 64 (1964).
3' See Karst, The First Amendment and Harry Kalven: An Appreciative Comment on the Advantages
of Thinking Small, 13 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. i, 8 (i965).
O1Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (ig5i); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (X957); Scales
v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (x96x).
2268 U.S. 652 (1925).
3O WmrroN & LARsoN, 236-37.
at 268 U.S. at 668.
8 3d. at 671. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was involved because state gov-
ernmental action was involved. However, in Gitlow the Court made clear that the first amendment is
made applicable to the states via the fourteenth, so that doctrinally cases are interchangeable whether
involving the fourteenth or first amendments, and one may properly speak of "first amendment free-
doms" even when states are involved.
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no significant barriers to treaty or legislative language directed at warmongering,
subversive, and defamatory propaganda.
Fortunately, Gitlow is no longer the law. Dennis, Yates, and Scales, decided in
i95i, 1957, and ig6, respectively, represent at least a partial return to the Holmes-
Brandeis version of the clear-and-present-danger test, which, especially as developed
by Justice Brandeis, 6 emphasizes the requirement of immediacy. Justice Brandeis
in his eloquent formulation of this constitutional standard emphasized the need for
a close causal relationship between the proscribed speech and the anticipated anti-
social action if punishment of expression was to be justified. He stressed two elements:
nearness in time and probability of outcome. True, Dennis, in which convictions
for advocacy were upheld, represents a diluted version of Brandeis's clear-and-present-
danger test. For in Dennis, Chief Justice Vinson accepted Judge Learned Hand's
reformulation of the test, which held that in each case the courts "must ask whether
the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of
free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."37  The consequence of such a
standard, of course, is to reduce the need for the government to show a high degree
of imminency if the anticipated danger is relatively grave. But certainly the opinion
by Justice Harlan for the Court in Yates breathes life into the imminency require-
ment by its "distinction between advocacy of abstract doctrine and advocacy directed
at promoting unlawful action."3 To Justice Harlan, the fine line between protected
and unprotected expression was "the essential distinction . . . that those to whom
the advocacy is addressed must be urged to do something, now or in the future,
rather than merely to believe in something. '30  He conceded the ephemeral nature
of this distinction, suggested by Justice Holmes's remark that "'every idea is an
incitement." 4 However, the distinction was bolstered and given additional sig-
nificance as a limitation by the rigorous degree of proof which was required to
connect the defendant to the utterances and the utterances to the antisocial outcome
which it was alleged they would bring about 1
Yates, then, seems to reduce the possibility of successfully challenging such a
5 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (concurring opinion).
' judge Learned Hand, in Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 395o), quoted in
341 U.S. 494, 510 (951). Of the flurry of discussion on the standard to be used after Dennis, see WALT.R
GPa.aboaN, AmEiUCAN RIHoTs 74-79 (i96o); Hyman, judicial Standards for the Protection of Basic
Freedoms, I BuFFALo L. REv. 221 (3952); Nathanson, The Communist Trial and the Clear-and.Present
Danger Test, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1167 (950); Richardson, Freedom of Expression and the Function of
Courts, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1951).
38354 U.S. 298, 338 (i957).
,
9 1d. at 324-25.
"Id. at 326-27, quoting from Justice Holmes's dissenting opinion in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 673 (925).
"At least as interpreted by Justice Harlan in his opinion in Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203,
232 (I963), where he stated: "The decision in Yates rested on the view (not articulated in the opinion,
though perhaps it should have been) that the Smith Act offenses, involving as they do subtler elements
than are present in most other crimes, call for strict standards in assessing the adequacy of the proof
needed to make out a case of illegal advocacy."
THE CONSTITUTION AND CUiMS ON PROPAGANDA 513
legislative proscription directed at propaganda on its face 2 But Yates and its after-
math are grounds for believing that there is a significant first amendment barrier
to the application of general language of this category to specific utterances. Apart
from the considerable number of prosecutions under the Smith Act which were
dropped by the Justice Department after the Yates decision, prosecution against some
of the defendants in that case itself was abandoned on the grounds that insufficient
evidence was available to show that they had advocated action, as distinct from
opinion.3 This general thrust of Yates was confirmed by Scales, concerning the
membership clause of the Smith Act. Justice Harlan, writing for the majority,
rejected the constitutional challenge to the clause on its face, but narrowly construed
the provision to punish only "active" membership and only membership with the
specific intent to accomplish the aims of the organization by resort to violence 4
How may these principles gleaned from Dennis-Yates-Scales be related to the topic
at hand? An international agreement or statute directed against warmongering
or subversive propaganda, defined in terms comparable to those used by Professors
Whitton and Larson,45 might possibly withstand first amendment challenges to the
validity of such language on its face. But any attempts to apply such general
language to concrete situations in a criminal trial would most assuredly face the
closest scrutiny, not only with respect to the adequacy of the proof proffered to
demonstrate the imminency of war-the evil which the legislation would prevent-
but also as to the meaning of the words in order to avoid application-and the
consequent constitutional issue-by narrowing construction.
The preceding cases are the most relevant for evaluating the proposed restrictions
upon propaganda because they deal with legislation, the specific purpose of which is
to punish "subversive" speech. Of other tangential lines of constitutional precedent, 46
the most helpful comprises those decisions evaluating restrictions upon expression
in light of time, place, and manner. In the felicitous phrase of Professor Kalven,
these cases deal with the use of the public ways as a "public forum."' The most im-
"On overbroadness as a first amendment limitation, see notes 62-65 infra.48 See GELT.HORN, Op. Cit. supra note 37, at 82, and sources there cited.
"It is true that Scales's conviction was upheld, but the bite of the narrowing construction was effective
in the companion case, Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (ig6I), in which a conviction under the mem-
bership clause was reversed for insufficiency of the evidence on the basis of the Yates standard.
" See text accompanying notes 4-6,supra.
"6I have not drawn upon the "obscenity" cases relating to criminal punishment for distribution, e.g.,
Ginzberg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, reh. denied, 384 U.S. 934 (1966); Mishkin v. New York, 383
U.S. 502, reh. denied, 384 U.S. 934 (z966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); or those cases relating to "censorship" or "prior restraints," e.g., Freedman
v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (ig6i); Near v.
Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697 (193). As for the former, the Court has used a definitional-
contextual technique which, apart from the discussion of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (see text accom-
panying notes 19-22, 25-30 supra), offers no assistance on the subject of this essay. As for the latter, they
add nothing to the cases discussed in the text when the concern about propaganda is focused upon words as
triggers to action.
"7 Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. RFv. i.
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portant are the two recent cases which, like New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,8 arose
out of the civil rights protest movement, Edwards v. South Carolina," decided in
1963, and Cox u. Louisiana,"° decided in 1965. Both involved, among other issues,
generalized breach-of-peace charges which were found unconstitutional. And despite
the difference in attitude between the earlier and later opinions that Professor Kalven
tellingly excoriates,51 it seems relatively certain from these cases that the Court will
continue to require a high degree of imminency, that is, something more than the
mere expectation of violence when it hears challenges to governmental action which
has suppressed expression in the interest of order. And that collision of interests
is identical to the class presented when "propaganda" is suppressed in the name of
"peace." Incidentally, although the Court has not yet fully developed the issue, one
may conjecture that the reaction of a hostile audience will not be a permissible basis
for suppressing a speaker,52 and this nascent principle is relevant to suppression of
propaganda that may imperil peace because of the hostile attitude of a "listening"
foreign government.
Of other cases developing first amendment principles, one of the most useful is
Shelton v. Tucker,"3 decided in i96o, invalidating an Arkansas statute requiring
public school teachers to file annually a list of every organizational tie. In formulating
the constitutional standard, the Court stated that only the most compelling interest of
the state justifies restriction of expression, and then also went on to say, "even though
the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved." 54 Thus in measuring proposed restrictions upon
warmongering and subversive propaganda by treaties or statutes, the Court will not
only be concerned with a showing of imminency of the social evil when expression
is restricted but will also evaluate the probability that the permissible goal of such
legislation could be achieved by other means, involving less harm to the constitu-
tionally protected preferred freedom. Thus, the question may be posed to those
who argue in favor of such legislation or treaties: Is there no other way of achieving
"8 See text accompanying notes 19-22, 25-3o supra.
'p372 U.S. 229 (1963).
,0379 U.S. 536 (1965).
':The general unhappiness of the Court with this line of cases is reflected in Brown v. Louisiana, 383
U.S. 131 (1966), a 5-4 decision overturning convictions under a breach of the peace statute for an
alleged "sit-in" in a public library. There was no majority opinion, but three different opinions resting
on separate grounds.
"See HARRY W. KALvEN, JR., THE NEORO AND TIE FIRsr AmFNDMENT 140-41 (1965); Note, Freedom
of Speech and Assembly: The Problem of the Hostile Audience, 49 CoLuM. L. Rlv. IxI8 (1949); Note,
Free Speech and the Hostile Audience, 26 N.Y.U.L. RaV. 489 (i95i); Note, Verbal Acs and ideas-The
Common Sense of Free Speech, 16 U. Cm. L. REv. 328 (1949).
58364 U.S. 479 (1960).
54 1d. at 488. The opinion is sharply criticized by ALXANDER M. BicKEL, THE LEAST DANoaous
BRANCH 51-55 (i962), who is rebutted in turn by Hyman, Concerning the Responsibility and Craftsman-
ship of the Judge: A Review of Julius Stone's Legal System and Lawyers' Reasoning, in Light of Recent
Criticism of the Supreme Court, 14 BuF.ALo L. REV. 347, 367-69 (1965).
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this end without directly suppressing speech? Moreover, the cases which have been
discussed suggest that the burden will be upon those supporting such legislative
devices to satisfactorily answer that question.56
The recent case of Lamont v. Postmaster General,56 decided in May of 1965,
reveals broader dimensions of the problem and is relevant to a possible statute or
treaty restricting the entry of warmongering, subversive, or defamatory propaganda
into the United States from without its borders. r As often pointed out,5" the
essential role of free expression in a democratic society relates not so much to the
right of the individual qua speaker but rather to the interest of a society, or com-
munity, in hearing all views and making its collective decision after all views have
been considered. This proposition was neatly capsulized by Professor Freund when
he said, "The right to speak is the individualized legal reflection of the more gen-
eralized right to hear, which is basic to the process of political flux."
59
Such a view was vindicated by the Lamont case, a landmark decision in which
the Supreme Court for the first time held a federal statute to be contrary to the first
amendment guarantees of speech and press. The case is especially significant for the
topic at hand, because the statute involved was directed at "political propaganda."
Congress had authorized postal officials to detain and destroy mail that had been
determined by the Secretary of the Treasury to be "communist political propaganda,"
unless the mail was requested in writing by the addressee or unless it was otherwise
ascertained that delivery was sought.6 ° The complaining party in Lamont was not
the sender; he had no interest in his own expression. But the decision of the
Court seems to recognize that freedom of expression in a political democracy has its
corollary in the interest of hearing, and it was the latter interest of Mr. Lamont that
was vindicated. The Court held that the requirement of a written request unconstitu-
tionally abridged "the addressee's First Amendment rights" because of its "almost
certain . . . deterrent effect" on any addressee.6' Justice Douglas, writing for the
" For a brief review of the operation of the preferred-freedoms concept, see Hyman & Newhouse,
Standards for Preferred Freedoms: Beyond the First, 6o Nw. U.L. REv. I, 44-50 (1965).
IS 381 U.S. 301 (x965).
" See pp. 507-08 supra.
" E.g., Hyman & Newhouse, Standards for Preferred Freedoms: Beyond the First, 6o Nw. U.,. REv.
1, 51 (1965).
9 PAUL A. FREUND, THE SUPREIE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 81 (Ig6I).
"
0Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962, § 305(a), 76 Stat. 840, 39 U.S.C. § 4008(a)
(1964). The statute defines "communist political propaganda" by reference to § i(j) of the Foreign
Agents Registration Act of 1938, which includes, inter alia, the following interesting words: "The term
'political propaganda' includes any ... communication or expression by any person (i) which is reason-
ably adapted to, or which the person disseminating the same believes will, or which he intends to, prevail
upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce or in any other way influence a recipient or any section of the public
within the United States with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a
government of a foreign country or a foreign political party or with reference to the foreign policies of
the United States or promote in the United States racial, religious, or social dissensions .... "56 Stat.
250 (942), 22 U.S.C. § 611(j) (z964).
61 381 U.S. at 307. In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Brennan made the proposition more
explicit. Noting that "the First Amendment contains no specific guarantee of access to publications," he
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Court, interestingly concluded with this statement: "The regime of this Act is at war
with the 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate and discussion that are con-
templated by the First Amendment,"62 citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
discussed above.6'
Neither the opinion by Justice Douglas nor the concurring opinion by Justice
Brennan suggests that the first amendment interest of "hearing" is subject to no
restraint. But they certainly mean that statutes or treaties barring the entry of
warmongering, subversive, or defamatory propaganda into the United States may be
challenged without raising troublesome problems of standing.!4 And they also
suggest that the first amendment interest of "hearing" may be invoked to test with
preferred-freedom rigorousness such statutes or treaties, both as to the imminency of
the anticipated evil and the availability of less restrictive but workable alternatives to
achieve the permissible legislative goal, so that the broader sweep of such legislation
would not necessarily avoid the impact of Lamont.
One final line of ordinary first amendment cases ought to be mentioned. These
concern the overbroadness concept derived from first amendment principles, 5 a limi-
tation concerned not with inability to understand what is prohibited-i.e., the vague-
ness forbidden to criminal statutes by due process-but with the delusive clarity of
meaning of a legislative proscription which sweeps within its scope clearly protected
activity as well as nonprotected activity and consequently wreaks its havoc on pre-
ferred freedoms by the repressive necessity of having to undergo the burden and
risk of challenge.06 This limitation may be illustrated by reference to the peripheral
part of Professors Whitton and Larson's definition of warmongering propaganda:
made the following important assertion: "IT]he protection of the Bill of Rights goes beyond the specific
guarantees to protect from congressional abridgment those equally fundamental personal rights necessary
to make the express guarantees fully meaningful. See, e.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497; NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449; Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. zi6; Apthekcr v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500.
I think the right to receive publications is such a fundamental right. The dissemination of ideas can
accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It would be
a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers." Id. at 308. (Emphasis added.)
This is a curious statement, which, considering the particular citations, might seem to suggest the interest
of "hearing" was being derived from, perhaps, the due process clause of the fifth amendment. However,
in the immediately succeeding paragraphs Justice Brennan consistently refers to "First Amendment free-
doms" as he considers the impact of the specific statute, and derives his standards from first amendment
expression cases said to require the Government to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest to
justify restrictions and also supporting the proposition that the Government has the "duty to confine itself
to the least intrusive regulations which are adequate for the purpose." Id. at 3o.
The recent cases concerning the right to travel abroad are alleged to involve a comparable interest, that
is, the opportunity to gather information necessary to make an informed judgment about governmental
policy with which all citizens are vitally concerned. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. a (x965); Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964). However, in neither case was the decision based on that issue.
62 381 U.S. at 307.
63 See text accompanying notes 19-22, 25-30 supra.
"Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, took explicit note of the "troublesome" possibilities in
such an issue. 381 U.S. at 307-08.
"See generally Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1o9 U. PA. L. RaV.
67 (i96o).
a" See FR~utND, op. cit. supra note 59, at 67-68.
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"War-mongering propaganda directly undermines peace by . .. building up ...
ideas that will bring on war."" If one should find in proposed legislation or treaties
proscribing warmongering propaganda terms comparable to these, then there is no
great risk in speculating that Baggett v. Bullitt6 8 for example, would be good
authority for the proposition that such legislation would be unconstitutional on its
face. In Baggett, the Court, relying on the overbroadness concept, invalidated the
Washington loyalty oath, which required employees to disclaim being a "subversive
person," defined, inter alia, as one who "teaches by any means any person to . .. aid
in the commission of any act intended ... to assist in the . . alteration of ... the
constitutional form of the government of the United States ... by revolution."69 Of
course, if such peripheral language in proposed statutes or treaties is severable, then
the more difficult problems already discussed remain.
One may conclude then, on the basis of ordinary first amendment doctrine, that
there are serious questions as to the constitutional validity of language which might be
included in proposed treaties and statutes proscribing warmongering, subversive, and
defamatory propaganda-at least, as such language might be applied in specific in-
stances. That is, there are serious questions unless the introduction of the conduct of
foreign affairs makes a difference.
II
"EMBARRASSMENT OF THE EXpcuTIvE," THE QUESTION OF "SURvIVAL," AND
INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS
The introduction of the subject of the conduct of foreign relations into a dis-
cussion of constitutional law brings to mind the rather pessimistic observation of one
commentator from the social sciences, Professor Woodford Howard:
Few constitutional problems have produced more discourse, with less result,
than the scope of constitutional limitation on foreign policy-making.... The fact
is that the nation's rise to giant power status has been accompanied by ever-increasing
discretion on the part of its authorities and only passing regard to self-limitation.
Constitutional theorizing, in the main, has been fruitless in the face of necessity.
Yet tenaciously we cling to a philosophy of limitation, some mechanical means
of control beyond the ballot box .... [A] closeted Princeton seminar [recognized
this trait] when Alpheus T. Mason shook it with a typical query: "What is the
future of our subject, constitutionalism, in an age of prolonged Cold War?"'70
With perhaps less pessimism, we can at least begin with certain fairly ascertainable
propositions.
87 VmTro & LAmsoN o.
6s 377 U.S. 36o (x964). And see the most recent decision in this area, Elftbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S.
1s (1966).
09 377 U.S. at 362.7
'Howard, Constitutional Limitation and American Foreign Policy, in EssAys o Em A. ECAN
CONsT'uTION 159 (Dietze ed. 1964).
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If it is not "hornbook" law it is at least "law review" law that the treaty power
is subject to the Bill of Rights just as any other laws enacted by Congress, and to the
same extent.71 Admittedly the best judicial authority we seem to have for this
proposition is the dictum of Justice Black in Reid v. Covert. 2 Professor Howard
is not as sanguine as I in this respect, but his reference to the congressional power
over aliens is not germane,7" and apart from the Japanese-American wartime cases,74
mentioned below, he has little to substantiate the proposition that treaty clashes with
the Bill of Rights would be treated less rigorously than congressional statutes. 73
Therefore, in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, we may assume that
a treaty punishing warmongering, subversive, and defamatory propaganda would
face the same scrutiny as comparable domestic legislation when first amendment
interests are invoked.
Moreover, when it comes to the implied power of Congress to regulate foreign
affairs, 70 we are not without precedent concerning the applicability of the Bill of
Rights and the rigorousness of that application. This was demonstrated in the in.
voluntary loss of citizenship cases decided since I958,'7 involving both the power of
" See, e.g., Lous HEMNaN, ARMs CONTROL AND INSPEacnON IN AmRmIcAN LAW 29, 169-73 nn. 14 & 15
(1958). The question was discussed with considerable heat during the height of the "Bricker Amend-
ment" debate. References are gathered in BisHoP, op. cit. supra note X3, at 104-05.72 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957)-
"*Howard, supra note 70, at 168, 173. The Court held that the Constitution does not contain sub-
stantive restrictions on the power of Congress to exclude or expel aliens, Harisiades v. Shaughncssy, 342
U.S. 580 (1952); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (i95o); and, indeed, no
procedural restrictions with respect to the power to exclude. Given these holdings, the treatment of
aliens with respect to exclusion and expulsion stands in contrast to exercise of other powers concerning
foreign affairs. Indeed, one may doubt whether the opinion for the majority in Harisiades, concerning
expulsion, would be literally followed by the Court. On the power over aliens, see Henkin, The Treaty
Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 903,
918-i9 (1959). See generally Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Admitted Permanent
Resident Alien: The Pre-sgs7 Cases, 68 YA.E L.J. 1578 (i959); The Constitutional Status of the Law-
fully Admitted Permanent Resident Alien: The Inherent Limits of the Power to Expel, 69 id. 262 (1959).
T4Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (944); Hirabayashi
v. United States, 320 U.S. 8i (943). See text accompanying notes 102-05 infra.
" Indeed, the real thrust of his article seems to be a reiteration of the thesis that the Court can never
offer significant protection with respect to any constitutional rights (see, for example, Howard, supra note
70, at 174, 177), a view sometimes attributed to judge Learned Hand in THE BiLL op RIsrrs (1958).
See, e.g., Mendelson, Learned Hand: Patient Democrat, 76 HARv. L. REV. 322, 334-35 (1962).
To the extent that misunderstanding here is involved with the "political questions" doctrine, see the
thoughtful study by Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question-A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE
L.J. 517, 542-48, 561-65, 578-83 (1966). Compare the less sophisticated statement by Howard, supra
note 70, at 168-69.
71 This is not among the enumerated powers of Congress. But if it was not clear before Perez v.
Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), that Congress had such an implied power, the Court made the matter
explicit in Perez and later in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. x44 (1963). See generally Henkin,
The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign Relations, 1o7 U. PA. L.
REV. 903, 918-19 (i959)-
7" Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (z964) (foreign affairs power); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144 (1963) (foreign affairs power and war powers); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (z958) (war
powers); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (x958) (foreign affairs power); United States ex rel. Marks v.
Esperdy, 315 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1963), afl'd by an equally divided court, 377 U.S. 214 (1964).
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Congress to regulate foreign affairs and its war powers. 78 It is true that initially, in
Perez v. Brownell,"9 the Court sustained a congressional statute providing for the
involuntary loss of citizenship by an American citizen who voted in a foreign
political election, the majority requiring a showing only of a rational nexus between
the withdrawal of citizenship and the regulation of foreign affairs, the end of which
was "the avoidance of embarrassment in the conduct of our foreign relations attribu-
table to voting by American citizens in foreign political elections.""0 However, two
more recent cases seem to depart from Perez insofar as it failed to treat citizenship as a
preferred freedom."' In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,8 2 a statute providing for loss
of citizenship by a citizen who departed from or remained outside of the United
States in time of war or national emergency for the purpose of evading military
service was held to be penal in nature and unconstitutional for failing to comply with
the fundamentals of criminal justice in the fifth and sixth amendments. Justice
Goldberg, writing for the majority, left no doubt that the preferred-freedoms status
of citizenship influenced the reading of the ambiguous statute as penal. In Schneider
v. Rusk, 3 the foreign affairs power and its administrative convenience with respect
to embarrassment in the conduct of foreign relations were invoked by the Gov-
ernment in support of a statute providing that a naturalized citizen residing
continuously for three years in the country of his birth should thereby lose his
nationality. In holding the statute contrary to the due process clause of the fifth
amendment on the grounds that it constituted an unfair classification, the Court
was led by the preferred-freedoms status of citizenship to apply a standard of review
more rigorous than mere minimum rationality. Neither case involved freedom of
expression, but they are relevant to a proposed statute drawing on the foreign
affairs power to punish warmongering, subversive, or defamatory propaganda be-
" The subject of this essay is the concern whether the injection of foreign relations into a case will
make a difference when the Court is asked to apply constitutional limitations. However, the war powers
cases have often been intertwined with foreign affairs cases, see, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra
note 77, and it would be ostentatious to offer proof that the exercise of the war powers will usually be
intimately related to the conduct of foreign relations.
In any case, there are cases which support the applicability of the Bill of Rights, without dilution, to
the war powers-cases dealing primarily with military jurisdiction over civilians. E.g., Kinsella v. United
States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (196o); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. i (i957). Cf. Duncan v.
Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (946). But see Howard, supra note 7o, at 174-75, who, curiously, would
dismiss the significance of these cases because they were "confined" to drawing a jurisdictional line
between civilian and military authority. But to determine who has, and who has not, power is to deal
with one of the most fundamental of issues.
The cases which cause the most difficulty are those which not only involve the exercise of the war
powers during wartime but also involve the exercise of judicial review during wartime. This problem is
discussed below.
11 356 U.S. 44 (x958).
8 0 Id. at 58, 6o.
s
1 For a discussion of citizenship as a "preferred freedom," see Hyman & Newhouse, Standards for
Preferred Freedoms: Beyond the First, 6o Nw. U.L. RFv. 1, 81-84 (1965).
82 3 7 2 U.S. 144 (1963).
8 377 U.S. X63 (1964).
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cause the opinions make it clear that not only does the Bill of Rights limit the
exercise of that power but the injection of foreign relations into an issue does not
dilute the vigor with which the Bill of Rights shall be applied.
The right to travel and passport cases8 4 add only a little to my thesis. In 1964,
in Aptheker v. Secretary of State,'5 a majority made the preferred-freedoms nature
of the right to travel clear, relying on the standards of first amendment cases to hold
that section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of i95o, making it a felony for
a member of a Communist organization to apply for or attempt to use a passport,
violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The power of Congress
involved was that of protecting national security. Zemel v. Rusk,"' decided in
May 1965, more directly involves the conduct of foreign affairs. A majority upheld
the Secretary of State's 1961 ban on travel to Cuba. Relevant to our discussion,
Zemel claimed that this denial violated the freedom of expression guaranteed by the
first amendment. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, distinguished the
earlier case of Kent v. Dulles," in which the passport had been denied because
of alleged associations, and concluded that Zemel's freedom of expression was not
involved. As a consequence, the language of Chief Justice Warren with respect
to the broader scope permitted the executive and Congress in the area of foreign
affairs is limited to the question of delegation of powers. It was only with respect
to delegation of powers in the area of foreign affairs that Warren stated Congress
"must of necessity paint with a brush broader than it customarily wields in domestic
areas."
88
However, there are other aspects of the conduct of foreign relations, recently
dealt with by the judiciary, which suggest some possibly startling paradoxes. I refer
here to the grounds offered by the Supreme Court for refusing to intervene in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.s9 A major factor influencing the majority was the
potential "possibility of embarrassment to the Executive Branch in handling foreign
relations."9 The problem may be suggested by this question: Could the President
enter into an executive agreement and achieve the same result which by hypothesis
I have, if not denied, at least questioned with respect to Congress? Silly? Well,
sT See generally SUCOMMITrTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL R-GHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND UNITED STATES PASSPORT POLICIES (1958); SPECIAL COMM. TO STUDY PASSPORT
PROCEDURES, ASS'N OF Tm BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw Yoat, FREEDOM TO Ta vEL (1958); Gould, The
Right to Travel and National Security, 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 334 (196i).
85378 U.S. 5oo (z964).
aI 381 U.S. i (1965).
87357 U.S. ix6 (i958).
a8 381 U.S. at 17.
89 376 U.S. 398 (1964). The writing on Sabbatino has been voluminous. See the bibliography in
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORx, THE AFTERMATH OF SABBATINO 218-20, 225-28
(7th Hammarskj6ld Forum 1965).
90 376 U.S. at 412. See notes io2-o3 infra. Compare the analysis of constitutional questions involved
in the Logan Act, Voigts, The Logan Act: Paper Tiger or Sleeping Giant, 6o Am. J. INT'L L. 268, 293-300
(1966).
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maybe. But the implications of Sabbatino seem to be the concern of any conference
concerned with international law. Moreover, the question may be even more
dramatically posed by assuming unilateral action by the President. The use of the
following hypothetical may lead us most quickly to Professor Mason's query, "What
is the future of our subject, constitutionalism, in an age of prolonged Cold War?"'"
Suppose that during the 1962 crises with respect to installation of Soviet missiles on
Cuban soil,"2 the President had been on the verge of an agreement with Castro which,
in the judgment of the President and his closest advisers, would have removed an
imminent threat of an all-out nuclear war involving the Soviet Union. Suppose
further, however, that at the crucial moment before agreement, Castro had refused to
proceed until a certain newspaper in Miami, Florida, ceased publications of edi-
torials which Castro charged as being nothing but "warmongering," "subversive,"
and "defamatory" propaganda. Suppose next that a phone call to the editor from
the President was unsuccessful-the editor invoking the first amendment's freedom
of the press as justification for his continuing to publish editorials attacking Castro
and his government. Assume then that the President ordered a military detachment
from a nearby base to immediately padlock the offending newspaper. Suppose now
that immediately after the military detachment performed its task the editor had his
lawyer start proceedings in an appropriate federal court to enjoin the military detach-
ment from continuing the padlock. Would the judiciary refuse to interevene for
the purpose of passing on the validity of the alleged unconstitutional interference
with first amendment rights, on the ground that such judicial action might em-
barrass the executive in the conduct of foreign relations-admittedly the conduct of
foreign relations having to do with national survival? Remember, at this stage the
question is directed simply to the problem of Sabbatino-that is, a refusal to hear-
not whether, on the "merits," the court would deny the requested injunction because
no constitutional rights were being violated.
The Sabbatino case, as we all know, concerned the nationalization of American-
owned property in Cuba by the Castro government and the claim that this nationaliza-
tion violated norms of customary international law.93 It is sufficient for the purposes
:I See text accompanying note 70 supra.
'0 See generally AssocATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YoRx, THE INTER-AMERICAN SECURITY
SYsTEm AND THE CUBAN Ciusis (3d Hammarskj~ld Forum 1964), including the proceedings of a forum
held in November 1962 and a bibliography on the Cuban crisis through June I, 1963; 1963 AMERICAN
SO'Y OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, PROCEEDINGS 1-17, 147-73. Description of the events of 1962 are now
appearing in the flurry of books on the Kennedy Administration. See, e.g., the perceptive review of
ELmE Aimr, THE MissrnE Cmisis (1966), by I. F. Stone, The New York Review of Books, April 14, z966,
p. 12.
08 This was the controversy upon which the storm centered, and assumptions as to how the Court
should have decided on the merits seems to have colored much discussion of the case and accounts for
such accusations as Friedmann's that dissatisfaction with Sabbatino on the "act-of-state" question is
necessarily tied to a desire for a decision holding the nationalization invalid. Friedmann, National Courts
and the International Legal Order: Projections on the Implication of the Sabbatino Case, 34 GEO. WAsH.
L. REy. 443, 448, 451-52 (1966).
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of this discussion to note that the property in controversy reached the shores of the
United States and came within the jurisdiction of a federal district court in an action
to recover the proceeds of a sale of the property. 4 The majority of the Supreme
Court, speaking through Justice Harlan, relied upon the "act-of-state" doctrine 5 to
preclude any judicial inquiry into the validity of the nationalizing decrees under
customary international law. The opinion is a long and complex one. Yet it is not
unfair to say that a major theme stressed throughout was that the act-of-state doctrine
not only has constitutional overtones derived from the doctrine of separation of
powers"' but that also the doctrine is grounded, at least in part, on the policy that
such an inquiry might embarrass the executive branch of our Government in its
dealings with foreign nations. For example, this statement: "The doctrine as formu-
lated in past decisions expresses the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its en-
gagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder
rather than further this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the com-
munity of nations as a whole in the international sphere."9 Taking another tack, and
stressing the uncertainty of the customary norms of international law which were
alleged to be applicable, the opinion suggests that a wrong guess by the judiciary
"might provide embarrassment to the Executive Branch.""
I emphasize that I do not rely upon Sabbatino for direct authority in seeking
a resolution to my hypothetical. Certainly, there are important distinctions between
that case and the hypothetical. For example, different systems of law are invoked
in each as authority for invalidating the challenged invasion of citizens' rights: in
Sabbatino, customary international law; in the hypothetical, the United States Con-
stitution. (However, one might suspect that the vague international law norms
involved in Sabbatino are only a degree more difficult to articulate than any constitu-
tional norms applicable to the hypothetical.) Moreover, Sabbatino may have its
primary importance as an interpretation of the role of a domestic court in interna-
" As pointed out by Lowenfeld, The Sabbatino Amendment-International Law Meets Civil Procedure,
59 Am. J. INT'r L. 899, 900 (1965): "The Sabbatino case itself was a freak case, in that it was the
plaintiff which claimed under an expropriation, and the defendant, who (by sleight of hand) had taken
possession of the proceeds of the expropriated property . . . . The typical situation . . . is the reverse.
There has been an expropriation, and some property belonging to the taking state later finds its way into
the United States. Plaintiff, a dispossessed owner, seeks to attach this property as a means of securing
at least partial compensation for his loss."
9 376 U.S. at 401: "The act of state doctrine in its traditional formulation precludes the courts of this
country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed
within its own territory."
"'Id. at 423: "The text of the Constitution does not require the act of state doctrine; it does not
irrevocably remove from the judiciary the capacity to review the validity of foreign acts of state.
"The act of state doctrine does, however, have 'constitutional' underpinnings. It arises out of the basic
relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of powers. It concerns the com-
petency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement particular kinds of decisions in the area of in-
ternational relations." Cf. id. at 940.
9 7 d. at 423. See id. at 428, 429.
9 81d. at 433. See id. at 436.
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tonal law."' Nevertheless, even one of the most able critics of the Court in this
respect, Professor Falk, concedes that Justice Harlan's opinion deals almost entirely
with internal relations rather than with the external relations which he views as
most important.0'0 Therefore, for all its differences, Sabbatino provides thoughts
for fascinating speculation, by asking whether the threat of "embarrassment of the
executive in the conduct of foreign relations," said in Sabbatino to justify judicial
forebearance, should also justify judicial forebearance in the case of the Miami editor
in my hypothetical. One could hardly deny that intervention in the hypothetical
case by the judiciary would serve to "embarrass" the conduct of foreign relations
by the President and, moreover, would do so in a situation of the gravest sort "in a
world where friendly relations often rest on very thin ice."101
This suggestion focuses our attention on the fact that the context of the hypo-
thetical-as indeed the context of proposals to restrict warmongering, subversive,
and defamatory propaganda-is that of "survival." And if this is so, then we may
find some assistance by looking to that development of constitutional law found in
the Japanese-American Cases,'0 2 arising out of and decided during the Second World
War. In these cases, the Supreme Court was asked to pass on the validity of the
internment of over iooooo west coast Japanese in what were, in fact, our own con-
centration camps. The scope of the program, its arbitrariness, and its shame have
been movingly described by Dean Rostow.103 He suggests: "These cases represent
deep-seated and largely inarticulate responses to the problems they raise. In part
they express the Justices' reluctance to interfere in any way with the prosecution of
the war. In part they stem from widely shared fears and uncertainties about the
technical possibilities of new means of warfare.' 0 4  He was writing at the time of
those events. But note that at this conference we are discussing what are apparently
widely shared fears and uncertainties about the impact of warmongering, sub-
versive, and defamatory propaganda. To return to the Japanese-American Cases, it
is sufficient for these remarks to note that by substantial majorities the Court sustained
the extraordinary interferences with personal liberty, finding such interferences
grounded in the congressional and executive exercise of those collective powers known
as the war powers. The several opinions of the majorities in those cases struggled,
almost desperately, to avoid giving a stamp of constitutional approval. But, in the
end, the effect of the decision was to refuse to review the reasonableness of the
Falk, The Complexity of Sabbatino, 58 Am. J. INT'L L. 935 (1964); Friedmann, supra note 93.
' Falk, supra note 99, at 947.
... Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State Department Suggestions: Recognition of Prerogative or Abdi-
cation to Usurper?, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 46x (1963).
'
1 Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (i944); Hira-
bayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
"'
1 EUGENE V. RosTow, TH-E SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE 193 (1962), reprinting The Japanese American
Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945). See generally, MORTON GRODZINS, AmERiCANS BETRAYED:
POLITICS AND THE JAPANESE EVACUATION (1949).
RosTow, op. cit. supra note 103, at 256-57.
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military and executive judgments concerning the necessity of the relocation program
as a matter of survival.
May we infer then that in my hypothetical an invocation of the war powers-
or at least "cold" war powers-would be found sufficient to justify padlocking the
Miami newspaper on the grounds that the judiciary would not, or perhaps should
not, substitute its judgment as to whether such action was justified in the name of
national "survival"? The Japanese-American Cases raise the basic issue whether
or not military and executive judgments exercised under the war power should be
subjected to the same judicial scrutiny that is appropriate when the lawfulness of
peacetime executive action is challenged as an unlawful invasion of private rights. °5
Note the phrase "the same judicial scrutiny"--one more conjecture may be helpful
before reaching some general conclusion with respect to the degree the Constitution
limits attempts to proscribe warmongering, subversive, and defamatory propaganda.
If we reduce the problem of the hypothetical Miami editor to one of national
survival, or even survival of the entire world, then who would say that the Supreme
Court should intervene if we were "absolutely certain" that, if the President did not
padlock the Miami newspaper, nuclear bombs would be launched within days
(hours) ? But, then, is not such a judgment, instinctive or otherwise, simply an
example of something like a clear-and-present-danger test in operation? And this
is so whether the judgment relates to determining the issue on the merits or to
avoiding judicial intervention by abstaining. For is this not a reflection of how
time controls how we act upon predictions? This may be illustrated by substituting,
with respect to the hypothetical, judgments along a spectrum ranging from "abso-
lutely certain," through "there is a good chance," to "it is not impossible that it might
actually happen, so why take a chance?" So that, to shift to the more familiar
terms developed in the first amendment context, when subordinating interests of
society which are compelling are gravely threatened and responsible men conclude
that the antisocial evil is close at hand-so close that there is little if any time to
take corrective action other than suppression of expression-then such suppression
will withstand challenge from the first amendment. 0 6
"' Rosrow, op. cit. supra note io3, at 258-59, would answer affirmatively. For suggestions of
further questions which must be answered in order to devise a workable standard here, see the sympathetic
and discerning review of Rostow by Nathanson, Book Review, 77 HAxv. L. REV. 1361, 1366 (x964). On
the abuse of the "political questions" doctrine with respect to these cases, see Scharpf, supra note 75,
at 561-66.
108 And in this respect it is pertinent to recall that the antisocial evil allegedly close at hand is the threat
of war, necessitating an exercise of judgment on the question of imminency when the factors involved may
well be immensely intricate and arguably, at times, beyond the control of the judiciary; and if the decision
must be made at the time of crisis, then without the comfort of hindsight. But this is simply to stress Pro-
fessor Freund's admonition that "Even where it is appropriate, the clear-and-present-danger test is an over-
simplified judgment unless it takes account also of a number of other factors .... No matter how rapidly
we utter the phrase 'clear and present danger,' or how closely we hyphenate the words, they are not a
substitute for the weighing of values. They tend to convey a delusion of certitude when what is most
certain is the complexity of the strands in the web of freedoms which the judge must disentangle."
FaREim, op. cit. supra note 59, at 44. However, to admit this does not require the double talk of Chief
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But to say this brings into better focus the proposed restrictions upon warmonger-
ing, subversive, and defamatory propaganda. In the absence of more specific pro-
posals we may again fairly resort to the definitions offered by such responsible persons
as Professors Whitton and Larson. I have already referred to their definition of
warmongering propaganda as that which may directly undermine peace by "building
up ideas that will bring on war."107 They also say, 0 s
Subversive propaganda, although it may not be as blatant and obvious in its
menace to peace, has perhaps done more to disrupt peace than any other form of
propaganda. The objective of such propaganda is ordinarily to produce violence
within a country-the violence necessary to overthrow the existing political order,
to stir up domestic strife, to set class against class, and to turn people against their
government.
It is not necessary to dream up a parade of horribles to suggest the broad reach
of such a definition. For example, would critical remarks about racial discrimination
in South Africa be within this definition? And I am not speaking entirely "tongue-
in-cheek" when I suggest that we could take the words of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and paraphrase them only slightly, direct them at a foreign government,
and find that we have another example within this definition of "subversive" propa-
ganda. Perhaps I am simply suggesting that the burden of showing the requisite
degree of immediacy has yet to be met with respect to warmongering, subversive, and
defamatory propaganda-at least as defined in such broad and sweeping terms.
Therefore, whether it be unilateral action by the President, joint action by the
President and Congress by the use of the treaty power, or the exercise of the power
of Congress to regulate foreign affairs-regardless of the power invoked-the con-
clusion is not substantially different from that reached on considering ordinary first
amendment principles. One may doubt that the injection of foreign affairs into this
discussion of constitutional law will make a significant difference. Whatever the
power invoked, there are grounds for believing that attempts to apply regulations
of such a general nature would receive the rigorous scrutiny the Court has designed
for measuring legislative collisions with preferred freedoms under the Constitution.
One cannot be so absolutely certain that national survival is tied to such regulations.
But beyond constitutionality, and as a matter of wisdom, I must confess that I
have some of the same reactions that I have when considering statutes such as the
Justice Warren, who seems to suggest that in such situations as the wartime cases the Court can consider
the question of constitutionality and both answer it and not answer it at the same time. Warren, The
Bill of Rights and the Military, in THE GREAT RIGHTS 87, 101-02 (Cahn ed. 1963). Nor does it seem
necessary to go as far as Dean Acheson, who suggests that "to talk of the legal aspects of the Cuban
incident reminds me of the the story of the women discussing the Quiz Program scandals. One said
that she felt the scandals presented serious moral issues. The other answered, 'And I always say that
moral issues are more important than real issues.'" He goes on to suggest that "the survival of states
is not a matter of law." z963 AMERICAN So'Y OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, PROCEEoINS 13-14.
2'7 See note 4 supra.
108 WHrrON & LARSON 1o. (Emphasis added.)
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Smith Act within our domestic scene. If antisocial acts, as distinguished from words,
may clearly be reached, and in fact are reached by law-whether acts of sabotage,
espionage, or other similar acts, including violence-then we may seriously question
whether it is worth the risk to become enmeshed in the stifling attempts to proscribe
speech as such. The late Professor Chafee, speaking in the early I95OS at the height
of the controversy over the Smith Act prosecutions, laid to rest rather effectively the
argument that runs: "Well, yes, but it's different now. Before there were only little
dangers." He reviewed in a dramatic fashion documents of the 1920S illustrating
the extent to which people then thought the danger was something more than
little, and he eloquently concluded: "Reading what everybody now agrees about the
panic-stricken alarmists of 1920, I wonder what will be said thirty years from now
about the alarmists of I952."' ' And what will they say in 1996?
A COMMENT ON PROFESSOR NEWHOUSE'S PAPER
NATHANIEL L. NATHANSON*
The only aspect of Professor Newhouse's analysis that I am inclined to question
is the failure to distinguish between warlike, defamatory, or subversive propaganda
directed to the American people and that deliberately beamed abroad. The distinc-
tion that I have in mind is not the one which he does mention between attacks upon
a foreign government and those directed against our own government. I agree with
him that this distinction is not a satisfactory one because the directions of our own
foreign policy may well be responsive to the popular opinion of foreign governments.
But the opinion which the people of other countries have of their own governments
is quite another matter. To the extent that anyone subject to the law of the United
States is primarily and distinctively engaged in attempting to influence the public
opinion of the people of another country, it seems to me that there are distinctive
considerations which are not allowed for in Professor Newhouse's analysis.
In the first place, the clear-and-present-danger test as conventionally stated and
as used by Professor Newhouse himself has little, if any, application to the situation
which I am positing. The attempt to arouse other people against their own govern-
ment does not involve advocacy of, or incitement to, the kind of action which our own
government has a right to prevent. The ultimate action is more properly described
as one which is none of our government's business. Should it follow from this that
109 Chafee, Thirty-Five Years With Freedom of Speech, i KAnt. L. REv. z, 6 (1952).
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